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Moderate Emissions Grandfathering* 
  
Carl Knight, University of Glasgow and University of Johannesburg 
 
Abstract: Emissions grandfathering holds that a history of emissions strengthens an 
agent’s claim for future emission entitlements. Though grandfathering appears to have 
been influential in actual emission control frameworks, it is rarely taken seriously by 
philosophers. This article presents an argument for thinking this an oversight. The 
core of the argument is that members of countries with higher historical emissions are 
typically burdened with higher costs when transitioning to a given lower level of 
emissions. According to several appealing views in political philosophy 
(utilitarianism, egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism) they are 
therefore entitled to greater resources, including emission entitlements, than those in 
similar positions but with lower emissions. This grandfathering may play an 
especially important role in allocating emission entitlements among rich countries. 
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I. Introduction 
A key ethical issue raised by harmful climate change is the allocation of greenhouse 
gas emission rights. One group of views is historical, in the sense that it takes into 
account past emissions. A well-known position of this general type focuses on 
‘historical responsibility’, holding that past emissions weaken the claim for 
entitlements to future emissions. 
An alternative historical view proposes ‘grandfathering’ of emissions, 
suggesting that past emissions strengthen the claim for future entitlements. Unlike the 
historical responsibility view, the grandfathering view appears to have been highly 
influential in actual emission control frameworks. Yet grandfathering is little 
discussed by philosophers, and when it is, it is typically dismissed as being patently 
unjust. Simon Caney, for instance, writes that grandfathering ‘seems perverse’, and 
that ‘as a matter of justice, it has very little, if anything, to recommend it’.1 Dale 
Jamieson similarly writes that to ‘[d]istribute permissions [to emit] on the basis of 
existing emissions’ is ‘implausible’.2 This article presents reasons for thinking that 
assessment unfair. 
The starting point of the argument is that members of countries with high 
historical emissions are typically burdened with higher costs when transitioning to a 
given reduced level of emissions than are members of otherwise similar countries 
with lower historical emissions (section II). This will engage the concern of 
utilitarians, as the transition costs ensure that emission rights tend to promote welfare 
better when allocated to high emitters than when allocated to otherwise equivalently 
situated persons (for instance, lower emitting but equally rich persons). The argument 
                                                 
1 Caney, 2011, p. 88. 
2 Jamieson, 2010a, pp. 271-72. 
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can be extended to appeal to several views widely discussed in political philosophy – 
namely egalitarianism (section III), prioritarianism (section IV), and 
sufficientarianism (section V). 
The position this argument supports can be referred to as moderate 
grandfathering. Moderate grandfathering says that an agent’s past emissions offer a 
pro tanto reason for future emissions entitlements to be given to that agent. A pro 
tanto reason for something is a reason that supports that thing, whatever other reasons 
– which may be stronger and countervailing – apply. My argument is that an agent’s 
high prior emissions provide a reason for that agent to have high entitlements, though 
other facts may provide reasons for that agent to have low entitlements. Other 
principles, such as historical responsibility, are often defended as part of a pluralistic 
overall view.3 There is no reason why grandfathering cannot also be defended on that 
basis. 
Another important feature of my argument is that it provides only a derivative 
or instrumental moral basis for grandfathering. I think both theorists and activists 
often oppose grandfathering simply because they see emissions themselves as bad. 
But emissions are clearly only bad contingently. In the past, anthropogenic global 
warming has been welcomed as increasing agricultural output and delaying the next 
ice age.4 Were those its main effects, emissions would not be bad. This suggests that 
what matters is not emissions per se but their effects. My argument is, in essence, that 
emissions are in one respect instrumentally bad (they increase harmful climate 
change), but in another instrumentally good (they enable beneficial activities). Our 
task is to reduce the badness such that the loss of goodness is minimized. I argue that 
                                                 
3 Gosseries, 2004; Caney, 2005a; 2010; Page, 2008; 2011. 
4 Callendar, 1938, cited in Jamieson, 2010b, p. 77. 
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this involves significant emission reductions, but ones consistent with giving more 
than average entitlements to those high emitters who significantly benefit from them. 
Like most other philosophers writing on emission rights, I assume a broadly 
cosmopolitan account, treating the allocation of emission entitlements as a matter of 
distributive justice which ultimately derives from individuals’ equal moral standing.5 
Such an account is consistent with allocating emission rights to communities or 
countries for practical reasons.6 Towards the end of the article I explain how, on this 
ground, moderate grandfathering can play a role in establishing the international 
allocation of emission entitlements (section VI). 
 
II. Utility 
Several writers have described the apparent appeal of grandfathering as following 
from the difficulty that high emitters face in reducing their emissions. Tim Hayward 
suggests that grandfathering ‘is justified by its proponents on the grounds that the 
high emitters are locked into their carbon dependence and that any attempt to reduce 
their emissions too abruptly would be catastrophic for them, and perhaps for the 
global economy as a whole’.7 Clearly this is only part of a justification for 
grandfathering; aside from making good on the controversial empirical claims, a 
principled explanation for why the (apparently) catastrophic effects of abrupt 
emissions reductions would legitimate less radical reductions is needed. This 
explanation is needed because lesser reductions will, plausibly, create catastrophic 
effects of their own, and we need some way of comparing these costs. 
                                                 
5 For Caney’s general cosmopolitan position see Caney, 2005b. 
6 Goodin, 2008; Baer et al, 2008.  
7 Hayward, 2007, p. 449. See also Singer, 2006, p. 420. 
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The proto-argument for grandfathering is developed further by Wesley and 
Peterson by bringing in utilitarianism. As they note, ‘people in industrialized 
countries have developed life plans on the expectation that they would be able to carry 
out certain activities, such as driving around in automobiles, that may even be 
necessary for normal functioning in the societies in which they live’.8 Were severe 
emissions reductions brought in, a ‘great loss in utility in the industrialized countries 
could be thought to stem from the violation of individuals’ legitimate expectations’.9 
As poor countries do not have a similar dependence on emissions, they would be less 
vulnerable to emission limits.  
However, as Wesley and Peterson observe, this argument is not empirically 
credible. Emissions reductions in rich countries, in contrast to those in poor countries, 
typically concern luxuries.10 It is not very plausible that the loss of luxuries in the rich 
world could constitute a graver catastrophe in utilitarian terms than the loss of 
necessities in developing countries, either resulting from emission constraints or from 
climate change itself. 
The key move in generating a successful argument for grandfathering is to 
reposition the considerations appealed to by the proto-argument as pro tanto 
considerations. So the reply to those11 who object that grandfathering rewards rich 
polluters by giving them huge emission rights and harms the non-polluting poor by 
giving them minimal emission rights is that grandfathering need not do neither. It may 
                                                 
8 Wesley and Peterson, 1999, pp. 178-79. 
9 Wesley and Peterson, 1999, p. 186. 
10 Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Shue, 1992; 2010a. 
11 Caney, 2009, p. 128; 2011, p. 88; Grubb, 1989, p. 83; Moellendorf, 2009, p. 117. 
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be that on account of countervailing factors high emitters get no more than low 
emitters. 
To see this first reconsider utilitarianism. Some account should be taken by 
utilitarianism of the transition costs suffered by historically high emitters. But that 
could not justify an above average level of resources, including emissions rights, as 
there is a powerful countervailing consideration. This is the fact that historically high 
emitters are in general inefficient converters of resources into utility. As historically 
high emitters will generally, for the foreseeable future, live in richer countries, a 
dollar (or an apple, or a bottle of water, or a medicine) given to the typical high 
emitter will yield less utility than a dollar (or other resource) given to the typical low 
emitter. A resource has greater value to someone on, say, half of the global average 
income than it would to someone on double the global average income. And of 
course, if we are working with the current massive global inequality, the opportunity 
cost of assigning resources to the rich is even higher. These considerations of 
diminishing marginal utility will be mitigated by the fact that in one class of resource 
– emission rights – historically high emitters will benefit in one regard (absence of 
painful transition costs) that low emitters will not from a given level of the resource. 
But that is not enough to overturn the opposed effects in all or virtually all other 
classes of resources. Utilitarianism thus does not suggest that available resources, 
such as emissions rights, are disproportionately allocated to high emitters. 
But none of this is sufficient to establish that utilitarianism does not support 
moderate grandfathering. Rich countries would be due even fewer resources had they 
not been high emitters. By illustration, consider two agents (who may be individuals 
or countries) of an identically high level of wealth. One of our agents, High, is a 
historically high emitter, but the other, Low, has, unusually, acquired her wealth 
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through low emissions. Other than the effects on their productive processes and 
preferences of their respective emissions levels their circumstances are identical.  
When deciding how to allocate a fixed reduction in emissions between these 
two agents, it seems clear that the utilitarian will assign greater emissions rights to 
High than to Low.12 Suppose, for example, that High emits 10 tonnes and Low emits 
5 tonnes, and it has been decided that their combined emissions need to be reduced to 
10 tonnes. A policy of equalizing emissions imposes a huge 5 tonne reduction for 
High, and no reduction at all for Low. A policy of moderate grandfathering, by 
contrast, would give limited priority to the higher emitter, for instance assigning 6 
tonnes to High and 4 tonnes to Low. This is a 4 tonne reduction for High, and a 1 
tonne reduction for Low. While these reductions will typically be painful for both 
agents, they significantly reduce the severity of the cuts required of the higher emitter, 
while imposing only a moderate burden on the lower emitter. Utility is very likely 
maximized in this case by allowing High to have greater emissions than Low. 
Furthermore, High will still be due greater emission rights than Low when we 
bring a third agent, Poor, into the picture. In this case, we assume that Poor is due 
greater emission rights than High or Low as extra emissions for her will promote 
welfare even more than extra emissions for High will. But this addition of a third 
party does not affect the relative importance of assigning emission rights to High and 
Low. Though High is due less than Poor, she is still due rather more than Low as 
emissions cuts for High still impose greater welfare penalties than cuts for Low.  
                                                 
12 In this and the following paragraphs ‘emission rights’ should be read as ‘emission rights and/or the 
means of purchasing emission rights’, with the ‘means’ being relevant only if emissions trading is 
permitted – on which I take no stance here. 
 8 
If this is the case in a High-Low-Poor world, it follows that there is a relevant 
difference between a scenario in which only Poor and High are present, and a scenario 
in which only Poor and Low are present. In both cases Poor has a greater claim on 
emission rights, but the inequality of emission rights is not quite as great in the first 
case as in the second case on account of the fact that denying High emissions has a 
greater hit to welfare than does denying Low. Perhaps tonnage in a High-Poor world 
should be split 4-6, but in a Low-Poor world 3-7 would promote utility better. This 
demonstrates that, even where the higher emitter has lesser emission rights, the higher 
emissions still strengthen the case for emission rights. Thus, even if the real world 
consists almost entirely of rich high emitters and poor low emitters, grandfathering is 
relevant and not unjust. The rich will be due a little more than they would be if they 
had not emitted so much. Furthermore, the high emitting rich will be due more than 
the low emitting rich even where there is an emissions trading regime, as they will 
otherwise be disadvantaged by the cost of buying permits. 
Note that the claim is not that high emitters suffer a higher ‘marginal 
abatement cost’, in the sense given to that in the economic literature as the cost of one 
extra unit of emissions reduction. In the first place, marginal abatement costs are 
standardly assessed in monetary terms, whereas my focus is on welfare costs. 
However human welfare is properly defined, it will not be in monetary terms. On one 
common view, for instance, an individual’s welfare level increases with the 
satisfaction of her preferences.13 A unit of emissions reductions can have both a 
monetary cost but no preference satisfaction cost (as where lost money is not missed), 
and a preference satisfaction cost but no monetary cost (as where preferred high-
emission leisure activities are avoided). 
                                                 
13 Hare, 1981; Harsanyi, 1982; Raz, 1986, ch. 12; Arneson, 1989. 
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Furthermore, the argument would be quite compatible with higher emitters 
having lower marginal abatement costs even if (counterfactually) marginal abatement 
costs coincided with welfare costs. The argument does, after all, grant that emissions 
reductions should be in proportion to prior emissions, so an agent who emits more 
than others will have to reduce emissions by more. For instance, under moderate 
grandfathering in the High-Low world, High had to reduce her emissions by six times 
the amount that Low had to reduce hers. For that to be justifiable, one would expect 
that the cost of each unit of reduced emissions would be lower for higher emitters. 
The respect in which high emitters face high transition costs is that they have to cut 
more units to reach a given lower level of emissions.  
Note that, in the real world, agents with high emissions will have varying 
levels of difficulty in transitioning to lower emissions. Hence there can be no linear 
relationship between prior emissions, transition costs, and future entitlements. But 
moderate grandfathering is justified in practice as prior emissions either always 
impose transition costs on agents or impose such costs often enough that 
informational limitations make the best policy that of assuming transition costs, and 
hence assigning extra emission rights. 
 
III. Equality 
Many will be unmoved by the above argument. After all, utilitarianism is often 
considered implausible because it ‘is not sensitive to the distribution of burdens and 
benefits across individuals (or countries)’.14 I will now suggest that, perhaps 
surprisingly, several egalitarian views which can hardly be accused of distribution 
insensitivity can serve the argument just as well as utilitarianism. 
                                                 
14 Soltau, 2009, p. 143. 
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Consider first equality of welfare, which simply seeks to equalize individuals’ 
welfare levels. This view is concerned with the transition costs of historically high 
emitters, but in a different way than utilitarianism. While utilitarianism sees the moral 
relevance of these costs in terms of the reduction in the overall amount of utility they 
impose, equality of welfare sees their moral relevance in terms of how they affect the 
relative advantage level of the emitter.  
Against the current backdrop of massive global inequality, equality of welfare 
delivers a similar result to utilitarianism, but for different reasons. In such 
circumstances it recommends an overall distribution that, at first glance, shows no 
similarity with grandfathering. Granting extra emission rights to historically high 
emitters would increase global inequality of welfare, which is the opposite of the goal. 
But on closer inspection it becomes apparent that moderate grandfathering is in fact 
playing a role. In the first two-agent case we previously considered, it is clear that 
High is due more than Low according to equality of welfare because the former’s high 
transition costs constitute what Ronald Dworkin calls ‘expensive tastes’: High 
requires above average resources, including emission rights, to secure equal levels of 
welfare.15 For instance, High may require 6 tonnes of emissions to achieve 5 units of 
welfare, while Low requires only 4 tonnes of emissions to achieve the same welfare 
level. As in the utilitarian case, the rationale for treating emissions as more valuable 
when assigned to High than when assigned to Low remains even where we bring in 
Poor, who is worse off in welfare terms. Similarly, the amount of emission rights 
required to equalize Poor’s position with High is less than the amount of emission 
rights required to equalize Poor’s position with Low.  
                                                 
15 Dworkin, 1981a. 
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Dworkin has argued that equality of welfare ought to be rejected. Furthermore, 
he specifically objects to its implication that expensive tastes require compensation, 
which was essential to the above egalitarian case for grandfathering. Such 
compensation is especially problematic, Dworkin seems to suggest, where the taste 
was chosen. For instance, ‘suppose that someone (Louis) sets out deliberately to 
cultivate some taste or ambition he does not now have, but which will be expensive in 
the sense that once it has been cultivated he will not have as much welfare on the 
chosen conception as he had before unless he acquires more wealth’.16 That equality 
of welfare would recommend that Louis be compensated for his acquisition of, say, a 
taste for vintage claret is, Dworkin maintains, ‘embarrassing for the theory … because 
we believe that equality … condemns rather than recommends compensating for 
deliberately cultivated expensive tastes’.17 About this much Dworkin appears to be 
correct, and so we should be dubious about equality of welfare. But his critique points 
towards further extensions of the main argument. Both an adaption of equality of 
welfare, and Dworkin’s favoured alternative, can support moderate grandfathering. 
Dworkin’s indictment of compensation for deliberately cultivated expensive 
tastes suggests that equality of opportunity for welfare might be a better account than 
straight equality of welfare. Equality of opportunity for welfare seeks to equalize 
individual welfare levels, except insofar as individuals are responsible for bringing 
about unequal welfare levels. As applied to expensive tastes, it offers compensation 
for involuntarily acquired tastes, while denying compensation for voluntarily acquired 
                                                 
16 Dworkin, 1981a, p. 229. 
17 Dworkin, 1981a, p. 235. 
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tastes.18 As such it appears to be immune to the Louis counterexample to equality of 
welfare. But can it support grandfathering as equality of welfare can? 
Here the relevant question is whether high emitters have voluntarily acquired 
their practices and tastes which are dependent on emissions.19 Some general doubts 
about voluntariness can be raised. Both Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, the two 
leading proponents of equality of opportunity for welfare, suggest that if the 
metaphysical position of hard determinism is true – that is, that all events, including 
human action, are antecedently caused, and that that is inconsistent with free will or 
responsibility – equality of opportunity for welfare has exactly the same prescriptions 
as equality of welfare. While we certainly cannot assume such a sceptical picture on 
voluntariness, it is equally cavalier to assume its falsity. Our metaphysical doubt at 
this point is perhaps best modeled by treating even the most evidently voluntary 
actions as partially involuntarily.20 
There are also factors specific to emitters’ tastes which may cause us to doubt 
their voluntariness. Individuals’ tastes are significantly influenced by upbringing, for 
which they cannot be held responsible. Given that climate change has only been well 
understood since the 1990s, tastes acquired during adulthood but decades ago can also 
                                                 
18 Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989. 
19 Thus, though luck egalitarianism focuses on individual responsibility, it does so in a very different 
way to much of the environmental ethics literature. In particular, its first concern is with ‘responsibility 
as attributability’, which is what an individual has brought about (see Scanlon, 1989, ch. 6). This 
contrasts with ‘substantive responsibility’, which concerns the obligations an individual is now under. 
The latter is the more usual focus in environmental ethics. See, for instance, Sinnott-Armstrong, 2010; 
Hourdequin, 2010; Booth, 2012; Raterman, 2012. 
20 Knight, 2009, pp. 152, 187. 
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be treated as relevantly involuntary:21 as Cohen has emphasized, it is responsibility 
for the expensiveness of a taste that matters for justice, rather than its mere 
possession.22 Finally, the social context in which individuals find themselves may 
mean that some high emission practices can only be avoided at a significant welfare 
cost. For instance, in some areas transport by car may be the only viable option. While 
these costs could be avoided through significant curtailment of mobility or relocation, 
it is clear that someone faced with such a choice who decides to stay mobile and in 
the same area – perhaps because this is the only reliable way to stay employed – is 
often not responsible for the fact that they need more resources (including emission 
rights) to secure the same welfare as others. 
An objection to compensation for such costs is raised in Axel Gosseries’ 
insightful analysis of grandfathering from a perspective similar to equality of 
opportunity for welfare. He suggests that ‘[t]here may be cases in which … transition 
losses should be compensated, in the same way as other disadvantageous 
circumstances call for compensation’.23 However, he opposes grandfathering of 
emissions – except as a transitional measure, or for emissions made prior to 1995. The 
key question for Gosseries is ‘whether the potential transition losers should not have 
considered the initial regime as obviously illegitimate’.24 If the transition losers, such 
as higher emitters, should have been able to tell that their regime was ‘obviously 
illegitimate’, they are not entitled to compensation. Only one argument for this 
position is presented, and as with so many arguments against grandfathering, it is 
                                                 
21 This has been proposed as a basis for a limitation on principles of historical responsibility; see 
Gosseries, 2004; Caney, 2010. 
22 Cohen, 2004. 
23 Gosseries, 2005, p. 298. 
24 Gosseries, 2005, p. 299; see also Gosseries and Hungerbühler, 2006. 
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convincing only against stronger versions of the view. Gosseries maintains that ‘it 
would be morally unacceptable (and even absurd) to allow men to claim 
compensation from women for losses resulting from the cancellation of clearly undue 
privileges’ acquired under a regime of workplace gender discrimination.25 This much 
we can readily allow, but it is insufficient to establish that grandfathering should play 
no role where there is awareness of illegitimacy. In the workplace example, the net 
compensation should clearly be from men to women, who have suffered serious 
disadvantages relative to men. Nevertheless, some men will be disadvantaged more 
than other men by the change – Gosseries even mentions ‘those who have invested in 
their career, suddenly facing a shrinking of their promotion perspectives’.26 Equality 
of opportunity for welfare requires that more disadvantaged men are compensated, 
either by transferring less to women than less disadvantaged men transfer or (what 
comes to the same) by receiving transfers from less disadvantaged men. Moderate 
emissions grandfathering takes high emitters to be relevantly similar to more 
disadvantaged men, in that they face involuntary high transition costs which require 
increased entitlements if equality of opportunity is to be secured. Although these 
entitlements arise through a history of clear illegitimacy, Gosseries has presented no 
reason for thinking that they themselves are illegitimate.27 
A referee suggested that, where some practice is obviously illegitimate, that 
obvious illegitimacy bars any compensation – even compensation from other 
participants in the illegitimate practice – in the event that the practice is ended. For 
                                                 
25 Gosseries, 2005, p. 299. 
26 Gosseries, 2005, p. 299.  
27 Indeed, Gosseries and Hungerbühler (2006, p. 125 n. 7) allow that ‘[t]axing less affected men to 
compensate more affected men’ may be permissible, but Gosseries does not recognize the clear parallel 
between more affected men and high emitters. 
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instance, ‘[i]f I'm a slave owner, in a period when slavery is acknowledged to be 
morally odious and illegitimate, then the revenue I derive from my slave I have no 
legitimate entitlement to. Thus if that revenue is taken from me, I have no legitimate 
claim to compensation from it, any more than a thief has a legitimate claim to be 
made whole if someone else takes his stolen loot’. 
The crucial question here is how far high emissions can be shown to be 
relevantly equivalent to slavery, in that they are obviously illegitimate. There are two 
forms of obvious illegitimacy. Slave owning is obviously illegitimate in both respects, 
but it is arguable that high emissions are obviously illegitimate in only one. 
First, then, a practice itself may be obviously illegitimate. It seems reasonable 
to assume that, like a slave economy, a high emission economy is obviously 
illegitimate. Gosseries writes that ‘the legitimacy requirement … is not satisfied in the 
case at hand, at least from 1995 onwards, for current emissions are higher than the 
level of emissions that countries should have aimed at from that date onwards’.28 As 
the legitimacy requirement is not met, Gosseries concludes that compensation for the 
losers of the transition to low emissions is unjustified. But from the cosmopolitan 
perspective both he and I assume, this would be to put the cart before the horse. Even 
though, in practice, individual compensation will probably have to be facilitated by 
granting countries increased emission rights in international negotiations, countries 
are not morally fundamental agents, and their prior actions, however illegitimate, can 
not justify disadvantages being imposed on their members. As far as equality of 
opportunity for welfare goes, at least, the relevant kind of responsibility is individual, 
and outside a few exceptional cases (presidents, prime ministers, and the like), 
individuals are not responsible for their countries’ actions. 
                                                 
28 Gosseries, 2005, p. 300. 
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 This leads us into the second kind of obvious illegitimacy. Here it is not the 
social practice, but an individual’s actions, which form part of that practice, that is the 
focus. For instance, ‘a slave owner, in a period when slavery is acknowledged to be 
morally odious and illegitimate’ will routinely engage in obviously illegitimate 
practices. He will be confronted with overwhelming proof of that illegitimacy on a 
daily basis, both in terms of the public condemnation he faces and his firsthand 
experience of the misery he inflicts. It is far from clear, however, that the typical 
member of a high emitting society faces similarly unavoidable and incontrovertible 
evidence of the illegitimacy of their actions. Part of the problem here is simply that, in 
spite of the scientific consensus, there is no shortage of people, some of them in 
prominent public positions, who deny that anthropogenic climate change is a reality. 
But there are deeper barriers to the obviousness of high emissions’ illegitimacy. As 
Jamieson has noted, ‘[o]ur current value system presupposes that harms and their 
causes are individual, that they can readily be identified, and that they are local in 
space and time’.29 As such, it is not well equipped to identify the harm associated 
with climate change, which results in part from ‘seemingly innocent acts’, and has 
‘diffuse’ and ‘remote’ causes. For high emissions, there is no consequence of human 
suffering ‘right here, right now’ as there is for slavery. These and other difficulties 
make climate change infamously intractable for the layperson.30 Equality of 
opportunity for welfare implies that individuals can not fairly be denied compensation 
for costs where they arise from differences ‘in their awareness of [the] options, their 
ability to choose reasonably among them, and the strength of character that enables a 
                                                 
29 Jamieson, 2010b, p. 83. 
30 See Gardiner, 2011. 
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person to persist in carrying out a chosen option’.31 Though the issue is not clear cut, 
it seems likely that it would be unfair to deny high emitters transition compensation 
on the grounds that their emissions were obviously illegitimate. 
In sum, while the support given to grandfathering by equality of opportunity 
for welfare is less secure than that of equality of welfare, as some emitters’ actions 
and tastes might in principle be identified as voluntary or illegitimate, there are both 
general and specific reasons for maintaining that the practices and tastes of high 
emitters are standardly neither fully voluntarily nor obviously illegitimate. That is 
enough to establish that they are due some level of compensation on account of the 
expensive tastes and practices which have been shaped by their prior emissions. 
  The third egalitarian view to be considered is Dworkin’s equality of 
resources. This view seeks to equalize a somewhat complicated form of resources. 
The relevant point here is that equality of resources suggests that the appropriate 
response to expensive tastes is to ask whether the holder identifies with them. Where 
individuals disidentify with their tastes, preferring not to have them given the option, 
‘[t]hese are, for them, handicaps, and are therefore suitable for the regime proposed 
for handicaps generally’.32 
Do historically high emitters identify with their expensive tastes, or are they 
compensable ‘cravings’? On the face if it, many high emitters do not regret their 
habits. For instance, some drivers take pride in their fuel inefficient cars as a badge of 
social status.33 George H. W. Bush’s declaration at the Earth Summit in 1992 that ‘the 
American way of life is not negotiable’ appears to reflect this sort of view.  
                                                 
31 Arneson, 1989, p. 86; see also Cohen, 1989, pp. 916-17. 
32 Dworkin, 1981b, p. 303. 
33 See Schwartz Cohen, 1997; Böhm et al, 2006; Paterson, 2007. 
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There are, nevertheless, several reasons for doubting that identification with 
high emitting practices would be widespread where a global scheme of major 
emissions reductions was put in place. One factor here might be increased social 
awareness of the effects of climate change that such a scheme would introduce. 
Another more narrowly self-interested factor would be the increased expense of high 
emission tastes to the individual where reductions in emissions are encouraged by 
increases in the cost of emitting. On Dworkin’s view it is (dis)identification with 
one’s tastes and their expense that matters for distribution. An analogy can be drawn 
with the decline of cigarette smoking in developed countries, which is attributable to a 
combination of increased awareness and expense. The decline of identification with 
smoking is even higher (as many smokers disapprove of their habit), and 
disidentification with high emission tastes might be even higher given that they are 
rarely if ever physically addictive as smoking is. A further point is that Dworkin does 
not propose to take just any (dis)identification as distributively significant. He writes 
that ‘[p]ersonality is not fixed: people’s convictions and preferences change and can 
be influenced and manipulated. A complete account of equality of resources must 
therefore include, as a baseline feature, some description of the circumstances in 
which people’s personalities will be taken as properly developed’.34 We might think 
that, in at least some cases, those who identify with their high emitting lifestyles, in 
spite of the unfolding environmental catastrophe and in spite of the increased running 
costs of their fuel inefficient cars, have been manipulated and should not be 
disadvantaged on account of their identification as it is inauthentic. 
We should not overdraw the argument here, and acknowledge that there are 
probably some cases where compensation ought in principle to be denied to high 
                                                 
34 Dworkin, 2000, p. 159. 
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emitters. Nevertheless, it seems that the standard case would be one of compensation, 
on account of either disidentification or inauthentic identification. As with equality of 
opportunity for welfare, it may be that non-compensable cases are sufficiently few 
and hard to identify that the best policy would be blanket compensation at a less than 
complete level. Disidentification provides another possible link between prior 
emissions and emission entitlements. 
 
IV. Priority 
Some writers have suggested that a concern with the interests of the worst off need 
not be a concern with their relative standing, as all the aforementioned versions of 
egalitarianism suggest. This seems appealing in light of the fact that any of the above 
forms of egalitarianism are committed to ‘levelling down’. For instance, if ‘half of 
some population are blind … egalitarianism would view a move to an entirely blind 
world as a good, or just, outcome in at least one respect’.35 To avoid this kind of 
problem, we might focus on the absolute, non-comparative position of the worst off. 
In this section and the next I suggest that the main two views of this kind may support 
grandfathering. 
Derek Parfit suggested that we should be concerned with maximizing the 
absolute advantage levels of the worst off, a view which has become known as 
prioritarianism.36 The simplest version of prioritarianism has only this concern.37 
This view, when combined with welfarism, can deliver a straightforward argument for 
                                                 
35 Page, 2006, 81. 
36 Parfit, 1996. 
37 Rawls’ (1999a) difference principle has this simple structure, though he combines it with other 
principles. 
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grandfathering. If High and Low are granted identical levels of resources, including 
emission rights, High would be disadvantaged in terms of absolute levels of welfare 
on account of the transition costs that High faces. For instance, High may have 
difficulty getting to work if he has only equal emission rights, as his country is car 
dependent, while Low can easily get to work with low emissions on his country’s 
effective public transport system. Even if emission permits could be traded, and High 
bought some of Low’s permits, High would still be disadvantaged, as he would now 
have less money than Low. High is thus due a higher initial level of resources than 
Low in order to maximize the welfare level of the worst off. 
The simple form of prioritarianism is often (in effect) combined with 
utilitarianism, to provide a limited priority to the worst off. As both components of 
this position support grandfathering, the overall view does as well.38 This limited 
priority view has itself been combined with responsibility considerations similar to 
those of equality of opportunity for welfare to create ‘responsibility-catering 
prioritarianism’.39 As all three components of this view support grandfathering, it 
again follows that the overall view does. 
 
V. Sufficiency 
The second view concerned with the absolute position of the worst off, and the final 
view to be considered, is sufficientarianism. On this view, distributive justice requires 
not that benefits be maximized, equalized, or directed to the worst off, but that 
individuals be provided with enough. Different versions of sufficientarianism answer 
the question of ‘how much is enough?’ in different ways. Harry Frankfurt’s influential 
                                                 
38 The same goes for combinations of utilitarianism and egalitarianism (see Parfit, 1984, p. 339). 
39 Arneson, 2000a, pp. 339-49. 
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early discussion treated individuals as having enough where they are contented with 
what they have, while Roger Crisp has more recently suggested that individuals have 
enough where an impartial spectator would stop having compassion for them.40 In any 
event, the crucial feature of the view is that benefits to individuals below the threshold 
of enough have unconditional priority over benefits to individuals above the 
threshold. 
Sufficientarianism may seem unpromising as a basis for grandfathering. After 
all, the view and its close relatives are familiar in a climate ethics context as a basis 
for limiting the emission entitlements of the high emitting rich.41 We should, 
however, be careful to distinguish the high emitting rich’s richness from their high 
emitting. Once we do so, it becomes apparent that some forms of sufficientarianism, 
at least, can support grandfathering. For instance, cutting the emissions of High so 
they are at the same level as Low’s emissions will leave Low no less content (she can 
emit as much as before) but High discontent (she has to emit much less). This 
difference is morally important on a Frankfurtian view which treats individuals as 
having enough where they are content with what they have, and justifies High having 
greater entitlements than Low.42 And for reasons that should by now be familiar, this 
follows even where Poor is present, and even where emissions entitlements are 
tradable. Thus, avoidance of below-threshold disadvantage offers a sixth possible link 
– after avoidance of utility loss, relative disadvantage, involuntary relative 
                                                 
40 Frankfurt, 1987; Crisp, 2003. 
41 Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Shue, 1992; 2010a; Caney, 2005a; 2010. For criticism see Knight, 2011. 
42 I say ‘Franfurtian’ as Frankfurt’s own view is concerned only with the distribution of money. For a 
view which takes contentedness with welfare levels as the measure of enough, see Huseby, 2010. 
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disadvantage, disidentification, and absolute disadvantage – between prior emissions 
and emissions entitlements. 
Still, some forms of sufficientarianism are less likely to support 
grandfathering. Whether Crisp’s view would give rise to grandfathering is unclear. 
Cutting the emissions of High so they are at the same level as Low’s emissions will 
certainly not make it the case that the spectator should feel compassion for Low, but 
may or may not make it appropriate to show compassion for High. That will depend 
on the extent of the impact on High, and on the proper conception of compassion, on 
which Crisp offers little guidance. Furthermore, on the minimalist form of 
sufficientarianism familiar from climate ethics, it seems clear that grandfathering 
would not be supported. Henry Shue, for instance, writes that ‘those living in 
desperate poverty ought not to be required to restrain their emissions, thereby 
remaining in poverty, in order that those living in luxury should not have to restrain 
their emissions’.43 If the threshold of enough is set low, so that only those who are 
poor (or badly off in welfare terms) by global standards are below it, it seems clear 
that a typical high emitter will not be in danger of falling below the threshold even 
with disproportionate cuts, and hence grandfathering will not be supported. 
There is, however, an important caveat. Versions of sufficientarianism with 
low thresholds are rarely intended as overall accounts of justice. It is not very 
plausible that, when it comes to distributing some good, such as emission allowances, 
the only distributive goal is to ensure that the very badly off are provided for. The 
amount of the good that the (merely) badly off and the averagely off get also matters, 
to some significant extent. Thus, precisely insofar as sufficientarianism fails to 
support grandfathering, it will need to be complemented by other principles. If those 
                                                 
43 Shue, 2010a, p. 202; see also Shue, 2010b, pp. 107-10. 
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other principles are utilitarian, egalitarian, prioritarian, or even (less minimalist) 
sufficientarian, they may themselves provide grounds for grandfathering.44 
 
VI. Practical Implications  
While the egalitarian, prioritarian, and sufficientarian views discussed above 
generally support grandfathering, it should be emphasized that they provide even 
stronger reasons for transferring resources from the rich to the poor than does 
utilitarianism. The utilitarian argument for global equality is instrumental, based on 
diminishing marginal utility. Egalitarians see global equality, in their favoured 
dimensions, as just fundamentally. Likewise, prioritarians see benefits to the worst off 
as being fundamentally just. Sufficientarians also see benefits to those below their 
favoured threshold as being fundamentally just. Even more than is the case with the 
utilitarian argument for grandfathering, we should see the egalitarian, prioritarian, and 
sufficientarian arguments for grandfathering as relatively small adjustments of 
distributions in the favour of high emitters, against a backdrop of massive emission 
cuts by the high-emitting rich. 
 It might be doubted whether the idealized conditions under which 
grandfathering seems plausible – in particular, those featuring High and Low – are 
ever actually approximated.45 However, the practical problem of assigning emission 
entitlements among countries is, in one clear and important respect, relevantly similar 
                                                 
44 Paula Casal (2007) suggests a minimal sufficientarian-luck egalitarian combination. Huseby’s (2010) 
view combines minimalist sufficientarianism with maximalist sufficientarianism, as it has a ‘minimal 
sufficiency threshold’ securing basic needs, which has ‘strong priority’ over a ‘maximal sufficiency 
threshold’ securing contentedness, which in turn has ‘absolute priority’ over other objectives. 
45 A referee raised this doubt. 
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to the High-Low-Poor world. Quite simply, our world does contain rich high emitting 
countries, rich (relatively) low emitting countries, and poor countries.  
An initial complication should be addressed. Our world does also, of course, 
contain countries that do not seem to be counterparts of either High, Low, or Poor. 
Middle-income countries are the main example here. However, the relative 
entitlements of the real world counterparts of High, Low, and Poor should not be 
affected by the presence of further parties. Of course, these further parties’ emission 
needs may reduce the absolute (non-comparative) entitlements of both High and Low. 
But it is hard to see how these needs would affect High’s entitlement relative to Low. 
So I will simply set aside middle-income countries in what follows.46 
I will also set aside poor countries. Almost any benefit we could assign either 
to a poor country or a rich country should, according to the distributive principles 
canvassed above, be assigned to a poor country. Thus, we can assume that poor 
countries will receive whatever emission entitlements they need for their 
development, and that virtually any claims against this that rich countries might have 
on grounds of grandfathering are outweighed (which is not to say disregarded). 
It is, then, concerning distribution among rich countries that moderate 
grandfathering seems most important. To keep the discussion manageable, let us just 
consider the G7 countries (see Table 1). 
 I will start by comparing Australia with Germany. This is about as close to the 
High-Low example as we are likely to get in the real world. Australia and Germany 
are more or less as well off as each other, yet Australia emits twice as much as 
Germany. If we thought it was plausible for High to receive greater entitlements than 
Low, I think we will think it plausible for Australia to receive greater entitlements 
                                                 
46 But see Knight, 2013. 
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than Germany. Consider the effects on these countries of grandfathered versus non-
grandfathered emission allocations. A non-grandfathering rule that limits each of 
these countries to 6 tons per capita would impose a manageable 33 per cent cut on 
Germany but an extreme 67 per cent cut on Australia. Since Australians and Germans 
appear to start off equally well off, egalitarianism and prioritarianism would oppose 
such a policy as it would make Australians worse off. Utilitarians would oppose the 
policy for the different reason that it allocates cuts in an inefficient and painful way 
by forcing the lion’s share on Australia. Sufficientarians probably do not recognize 
even post-cut Australians as below their sufficiency threshold, but any plausible 
sufficientarian will endorse other (maybe utilitarian, egalitarian, or prioritarian) 
principles that are likely to disapprove of burdening Australians in this way. The 
distributive principles would be much better served by a rule that incorporates 
moderate grandfathering, allowing Australia greater emissions than Germany while 
insisting that Australia makes greater cuts. For instance, Australia could be required to 
cut to 8 tons (a 10.2 ton or 56 per cent reduction) and Germany to 4 tons (a 5 ton or 44 
per cent reduction).47 
 Things are slightly more complicated where we consider countries that are not 
equally rich initially. For instance, the United States is somewhat richer than Italy. 
The complication here is the presence of a further consideration, which I will call the 
‘disadvantage consideration’. As we have seen, there are utilitarian, egalitarian, 
prioritarian, and (sometimes) sufficientarian reasons for directing extra assistance to 
                                                 
47 Given that Germany has a much larger population than Australia, this policy would actually reduce 
emissions more than the non-grandfathering policy described earlier in the paragraph. This is not, of 
course, relevant to the present point. Similar considerations apply to the discussion of the United States 
and Italy below. 
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the less advantaged. That is a decisive consideration where we are comparing a rich 
country with a poor country. It is still relevant, though not decisive, where we are 
comparing two rich countries, and there are grounds, such as a disparity in income, 
for thinking that the citizens of one country (here, the United States) are better off in 
welfare (or Dworkinian resource) terms than those of another (Italy).48 The 
disadvantage consideration and grandfathering consideration are countervailing where 
the better off country is higher emitting, as seems to be true in the United States-Italy 
case. There remains a clear role for the grandfathering consideration in such cases. 
The disadvantage consideration tells in favour of extra resources, such as emission 
entitlements, for the less advantaged country, so were the grandfathering 
consideration disregarded, we would expect Italy’s overall emission entitlement to be 
greater than the United States’. But the grandfathering consideration suggests that, in 
one respect, the United States has a stronger claim for emission entitlements, namely 
the fact that it has a recent history of higher emissions. Exactly what the final 
allocation should be will depend on how we weigh these considerations against one 
another, a question I can not address here. But it is evident that the grandfathering 
consideration will shift the allocation in the United States’ direction. Furthermore, this 
is intuitively acceptable. With the disadvantage consideration alone, the 
aforementioned cut to an average of 6 tons per capita should be achieved in such a 
way that Italy has greater entitlements – maybe the United States’ entitlement would 
be 5 tons and Italy’s 7 tons. This has the absurd result of a 12.3 ton or 71 per cent cut 
for the United States, and a 0.3 ton or 4 per cent increase for Italy. Where we take 
into account both the disadvantage and grandfathering considerations, much more 
                                                 
48 Of course, if we instead suppose that Italians are not actually disadvantaged relative to Americans in 
welfare (or Dworkinian resource) terms, this case is a simple High-Low case, like Australia-Germany.  
 27 
plausible options are available – for instance, entitlements of 5 tons for Italy 
(implying a 1.7 ton or 25 per cent cut) and 7 tons for the United States (implying a 
10.3 ton or 60 per cent cut). 
 I have considered one case that closely approximates High-Low (Australia-
Germany), and one case that may add the complication that one country’s citizens are 
better off than the other’s (United States-Italy). Most comparisons among the G7 
countries fall between the two kinds of cases, but closer to the first case. For instance, 
Canada and Australia are a little richer than the United Kingdom and France, but not 
so much that any significant difference in welfare or Dworkin’s resources can be 
inferred. Indeed, such an inference is not rock solid even in the United States-Italy 
case, which involves far greater economic inequality (a per capita income difference 
of $13,320) – perhaps even that case should be treated as a pure High-Low scenario. I 
consequently hold that most of these comparisons are similar enough to the High-Low 
case for it to be assumed that economic considerations (for instance, Canadian per 
capita income being $2,380 higher than British per capita income) are much less 
weighty than grandfathering considerations. The overall pattern of emission 
entitlements among the G7, and probably rich countries in general, can therefore be 
expected to be strongly influenced by grandfathering. Leaving aside the United States, 
which is an economic outlier and a difficult case, the high emitters Australia and 
Canada are due greater emissions than are the mid-level emitters Germany and the 
United Kingdom, who are in turn due greater emissions than the (relative to their 
peers) low-emitting France and Italy. 
 
 
 
 28 
VII. Conclusion 
I have argued that the costs imposed by forced movements to specific lower levels of 
emissions are higher for high emitters than they are for low emitters. On this 
instrumental ground I have defended a moderate form of grandfathering, which holds 
that an individual’s prior emissions provide a pro tanto reason for emission rights to 
be granted to that individual.49 The argument can rely on utilitarian, egalitarian, 
prioritarian, or sufficientarian premises, or on a pluralistic position combining more 
than one of these premises. While grandfathering is not a weighty enough 
consideration to mandate greater emission entitlements for rich high emitters rather 
than poor low emitters, among similarly rich countries, it is generally weighty enough 
to justify greater entitlements for higher emitters.  
Evidently much more would need to be said to provide a full defence of 
moderate grandfathering. I will finish by briefly mentioning two areas in which that 
defence is especially needed. First, and as mentioned at the outset, I have assumed 
cosmopolitanism. Some would see that as giving insufficient weight to the moral 
value of national membership or self-determination.50 Second, utilitarianism, 
egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism support grandfathering best 
where they are combined with subjective accounts of advantage, such as welfare as 
usually understood or Dworkinian resources. Where an objective account, such as a 
conventional conception of resources or (perhaps) capabilities, is assumed, there is no 
reference to individual preferences, and hence the argument must proceed by referring 
                                                 
49 My view has a similar emphasis to Steven Shavell’s (2008, pp. 37-8) more general position ‘that 
legal rules should be more stable than would apparently be appropriate, that is, appropriate were past 
behaviour not taken into account’. 
50 See Rawls, 1999b; Miller, 2007. On emission rights specifically see Miller, 2009.  
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only to cases of objective disadvantage.51 While some such cases support 
grandfathering (for instance, that of the person who can only reach her workplace if 
she drives), the argument proceeds less easily without subjective disadvantage. 
Clearly these are major topics, and it would take me too far afield to engage 
substantively with them here. But it is worth pointing out that the case for 
grandfathering can be expected to be somewhat durable, given that a variety of well 
known approaches to these topics support it. Caney writes that to his knowledge, ‘no 
moral and political philosopher … defends grandfathering, presumably assuming that 
it is unjust’.52 If my argument is correct, many, if not most, moral and political 
philosophers should, on account of their other commitments, support moderate 
grandfathering. 
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Table 1. Gross national income per capita and CO2 emissions per capita of the G7 
countries.53 
Country Gross national income per 
capita, purchasing power 
parity (international $), 
2009 
CO2 emissions per capita 
(metric tons), 2009 
United States $45,390 17.3 
Australia $37,500 18.2 
Canada $37,190 15.2 
Germany $36,500 9 
United Kingdom $34,810 7.7 
France $34,280 5.6 
Italy $32,070 6.7 
 
                                                 
53 Compiled from World Bank 2013a; 2013b. 
